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et al.: Constitutional Law
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
I. COURT ADOPTS NEW TEST FOR PERSONAL JURISDICTION
OVER FOREIGN DEFENDANTS

In Southern Plastics Co. v. Southern Commerce Bank,1 the South
Carolina Supreme Court adopted a two-prong due process test for determining
whether South Carolina courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign
2
defendants. In doing so, the court expressly discarded its prior four-part test.
Specifically, the court held the mere issuance of a letter of credit by a Florida
bank was insufficient to allow South Carolina to exercise personal jurisdiction
over the foreign bank.'
Southern Commerce Bank (the "Bank"), a bank chartered under the laws
of Florida, issued a letter of credit in the amount of $11,539.00 on behalf of
one of its customers, Media Cell of America, Inc. ("Media Cell"), a company
located in Tampa, Florida. Southern Plastics Company ("Southern Plastics"),
a South Carolina manufacturer, agreed to sell goods to Media Cell on credit,
but required that the extension of credit be secured. The letter of credit,
issued from the Bank's office in Tampa, expressly named Southern Plastics as
the beneficiary. Further, the letter of credit allowed Southern Plastics to draft
the funds at the Bank's Tampa office. 4
The question of personal jurisdiction arose when Southern Plastics filed
suit alleging that the Bank wrongfully dishonored its demand for payment.
The Bank subsequently filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction.'
In the opinion, the South Carolina Supreme Court began by noting that
the party who seeks to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident must
carry the burden of establishing such jurisdiction. The court then stated the
well-developed rule that the determination of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident involves a two part analysis. First, the South Carolina long-arm
statute must apply. Second, the courts must find that exercise of personal
jurisdiction via the long-arm statute does not violate the nonresident's due
process rights. 6
1. _ S.C.
,423 S.E.2d 128 (1992).
2. See Colite Indus., Inc. v. G.W. Murphy Constr. Co., 297 S.C. 426, 377 S.E.2d 321
(1989). The Colite court considered "four factors in determining whether due process
requirements are satisfied: 1) duration of the defendant's activity in this State; 2) the character
and circumstances of its acts; 3) inconvenience to the parties; and 4) the State's interest in
exercising jurisdiction." Id. at 429, 377 S.E.2d at 322 (citing Atlantic Soft Drink Co. v. South
Carolina Nat'l Bank, 287 S.C. 228, 336 S.E.2d 876 (1985)).
3. Southern Plastics Co., __ S.C. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 132.
4. Id. at_,423 S.E.2d at 130.
5. Id. at_, 423 S.E.2d at 130.
6. Id. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 130 (citing Aviation Assocs. & Consultants, Inc. v. Jet Time,

Published by Scholar Commons, 1993

1

South
Carolina
Law Review,
45, Iss. 1 [1993], Art.[Vol.
5
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW Vol.
REVIEW

45

The South Carolina Supreme Court further noted that the trial judge failed
to perform either step of the jurisdictional analysis when it denied the Bank's
motion to dismiss. The trial judge premised his conclusory holding on the
belief that the rule in Atlantic Soft Drink Co. v. South CarolinaNational
Bank7 controlled!
Noting that South Carolina's long-arm statute9 gives courts broad powers
to exercise personal jurisdiction, the Southern Plasticscourt concluded that the
case warranted application of the statute. 11 While Hammond v. Cummins
Engine Co." recognized that South Carolina's long-arm statute may extend
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based on a single transaction, such an extension must comport with the classical due process test set
forth by the12 United States Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.
In Southern Plastics the court broke down the due process requirement
into a two-prong test of "power" and "fairness." First, due process requires
that the defendant have at least minimum contacts with South Carolina. 3
Without minimum contacts a state lacks the power to exercise personal
jurisdiction. 4 In addition, the court must find that its exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the foreign defendant is "reasonable" or "fair."' 5 If either
of these prongs fail, then the forum state's exercise of in personam jurisdiction
over the nonresident defendant offends "traditional notions of fair play and
justice."16

Inc., 303 S.C. 502, 505, 402 S.E.2d 177, 179 (1991)).
7. 287 S.C. 228, 336 S.E.2d 876 (1985). InAtlantic the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that a letter of credit issued by National Bank of North America was sufficient basis for South
Carolina's exercise of personal jurisdiction because the debtor Atlantic Soft Drink received drafts
on the letter of credit through cashier's checks issued by a South Carolina bank. Id. at 229, 336
S.E.2d at 877.
8. Southern PlasticsCo., - S.C. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 130.
9. The long-arm statute is codified at § 36-2-803 of the South Carolina Code. In pertinent
part it provides: "(1) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly
or by an agent as to a cause of action arising from the person's (a) transacting any business in
this State. . . ." S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803(1)(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
10. Southern Plastics Co.,__ S.C. at,
423 S.E.2d at 130.
11. 287 S.C. 200, 336 S.E.2d 867 (1985).
12. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
13. Southern Plastics Co., _ S.C. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 131 (citing Aviation Assocs. &
Consultants, Inc. v. Jet Time, Inc., 303 S.C. 502, 507, 402 S.E.2d 177, 180 (1991)); see also
InternationalShoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (originating the minimum contacts requirement).
14. Southern Plastics Co., _ S.C. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 131 (citing State v. Ford Motor
Co., 208 S.C. 379, 38 S.E.2d 242 (1946)).
15. Id. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 131 (citing FordMotor Co., 208 S.C. 379, 38 S.E.2d 242).
16. AviationAssocs. & Consultants,Inc., 303 S.C. at 507, 402 S.E.2d at 180 (citing Colite
Indus., Inc. v. G.W. Murphy Constr. Co., 297 S.C. 426, 429, 377 S.E.2d 321, 322 (1989)).
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In determining whether the power prong was satisfied, the court
considered whether the Bank directed its activities toward a South Carolina
resident and whether the cause of action arose out of or related to those
activities. 7 The court further noted:
A single act that causes harm in this State may create sufficient minimum
contacts where the harm arises out of or relates to that act. In addition,
the defendant's activities directed to a resident of this State must be its own
and not the unilateral activities of some other entity. The defendant must
purposefully avail itself of the privileges of conducting activities in this
8
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of our laws.'
The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected Southern Plastics' argument
that the Bank had established the requisite minimum contacts by issuance of
the letter of credit.' 9 In doing so, the court relied on the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. °
Burger King addressed whether a resident's contract with a foreign
defendant alone automatically established the requisite minimum contacts
necessary for personal jurisdiction by the resident's state. The Court held that
the resident's state cannot exercise in personam jurisdiction solely based upon
a contract's existence. To permit such exercise of jurisdiction would be to
give in to "'mechanical' tests" 2 or to "'conceptualistic . . . theories. ' ' n
Rather, the Court took a "highly realistic" approach noting that evaluating a
contract requires a consideration of many factors including prior negotiations,
contemplated future consequences, multiple terms, and the actual course of
dealing between the parties.' Therefore, courts must consider all of these
factors to determine whether minimum contacts exist rather than automatically
finding minimum contacts based solely on the contract.24
The South Carolina Supreme Court relied heavily on the Burger King
opinion and accordingly held that "the Bank's mere issuance of a letter of
credit to Southern, standing alone, is insufficient to constitute an act by which
the Bank purposefully established minimum contacts with South Carolina, and
therefore could reasonably have anticipated being haled into court here. " '

17. Southern Plastics Co., __ S.C. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 131 (citing Aviation Assocs. &
Consultants,Inc., 303 S.C. at 508, 402 S.E.2d at 180).
18. Id. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 131 (citations omitted).
19. Id. at__, 423 S.E.2d at 131.
20. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
21. Id. at 478 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
22. Id. (quoting Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316 (1943)).
23. Id. at 479.
24. Id. at 478-79.
25. Southern Plastics Co. v. Southern Commerce Bank, _ S.C.
,
, 423 S.E.2d 128,
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The court cited opinions of various federal courts to support its conclusion.2 6
As to the fairness prong, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that "it
would be unreasonable for South Carolina to exercise personal jurisdiction
over the Bank."27 In determining whether exercise of jurisdiction was fair
or reasonable, the court relied on the factors listed in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson.28 The factors considered include:
"the burden on the defendant[;I... the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff s interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief; the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
the several States in
resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of
29
furthering fundamental substantive social policies."
Finally, in concluding that a letter of credit issued by the Bank alone was not
sufficient to allow South Carolina to exercise in personam jurisdiction, the
South Carolina Supreme Court considered various public policy concerns.3"
With its holding in Southern Plastics, the South Carolina Supreme Court
took the "opportunity to adopt the due process analysis articulated by the
United States Supreme Court. "3 Contrary to the inference arising from that
statement, it would appear that the applicability of the Due Process Clause32
of the United States Constitution and its effect on a state court's exercise of
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants is not "optional." Due
process is an independent constitutional requirement made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Southern Plastics the South Carolina Supreme Court expressly
authorized practitioners to refrain from consulting previous South Carolina
case law on due process requirements in exercising personal jurisdiction over

132 (1992).
26. Id. at
,423 S.E.2d at 132 (citing Pacific Reliant Indus., Inc. v. Amerika Samoa Bank,
901 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting personal jurisdiction over an Oregon bank on the basis
of issuing a letter of credit in favor of an Oregon beneficiary); Leney v. Plum Grove Bank, 670
F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1982) (rejecting Colorado's personaljurisdictionover an Illinois bank merely
because it issued a letter of credit at the request of an Illinois customer to a California resident
as part payment for sale to a Colorado corporation of Colorado real property); Occidental Fire
& Casualty Co. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 689 F. Supp. 564 (E.D.N.C. 1988)
(holding nonresident bank not subject to suit in North Carolina when it dishonored a letter of
credit to a resident beneficiary)).
,423 S.E.2d at 132.
27. Id. at
28. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
29. Southern Plastics Co., __ S.C. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 132 (alteration in original)
(citations omitted) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292).
, 423 S.E.2d at 132.
30. See id. at
423 S.E.2d at 129.
31. Id. at,
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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nonresidents.
Because Southern Plastics adopted the federal analysis,
practitioners may now directly consult federal case law on whether a particular
court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
in fact offends
33
"'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'
As previously noted, the South Carolina Supreme Court will analyze the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents as follows: First, the South
Carolina long-arm statute must apply. After the holding in Southern Plastics,
this step is merely a formality. In effect, the South Carolina Supreme Court
greatly reduced the applicability of South Carolina's long-arm statute with this
decision. The court cited Hammond v. Cummins Engine Co. 4 for its rule
that South Carolina's long-arm statute "has been construed to extend to the
limits of due process. " " Such expansive language can be interpreted to
mean that due process acts as the only limiting factor to the applicability of
South Carolina's long-arm statute over nonresident defendants. If so, then the
applicability of the long-arm statute becomes a foregone conclusion in most
cases, rendering the due process analysis the only requirement for South
Carolina courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.
Having established the proper standard, was the result in Southern Plastics
correct? The South Carolina Supreme Court reached the correct result because
any other conclusion would place a tremendous burden on financial institutions
that issue letters of credit to nonresidents for its resident clients.
The particular fact scenario of this case is analogous to that of WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 6 In World-Wide Volkswagen the
petitioner, a regional distributor of Audi automobiles, was. a New York
corporation that operated solely in New York. The respondent bought the car
in New York,. but was involved in an accident in Oklahoma. The respondent
sued in Oklahoma, arguing that it was foreseeable that an automobile could
cause injury in Oklahoma.37 The United States Supreme Court responded
that "'foreseeabi l ity' alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. "8 On the other hand, foreseeability is not totally irrelevant. The type of relevant foreseeability in the due
process analysis is whether "the defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into

33. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
34. 287 S.C. 200, 336 S.E.2d 867 (1985).
35. Southern Plastics Co., _ S.C. at __, 423 S.E.2d at 130.
36. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
37. Id. at 295.
38. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1993

5

South
Carolina
Law Review,
45, Iss. 1 [1993], Art.[Vol.
5
LAW Vol.
REVIEW
45
SOUTH
CAROLINA

court there. "" Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz40 also reiterated this
standard.4 1
Hanson v. Denckla42 originally set forth the standard used to determine
when a defendant should anticipate being haled into an out-of-state court. The
Court stated:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the
forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and
nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that there
be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
the forum State, thus invoking the
privilege of conducting activities within
43
benefits and protections of its laws.
As the South Carolina Supreme Court noted, the Bank maintained very
limited contact with South Carolina. Therefore, the Bank could not "reasonably anticipate being haled into court"" in South Carolina by the mere
issuance of a letter of credit naming a South Carolina company as a beneficiary. Finding the mere issuance of a letter of credit naming a particular
beneficiary sufficient contact to establish personal jurisdiction would indeed
place a tremendous burden on commerce. Such a conclusion would deter
banks from issuing letters of credit to beneficiaries outside the state. It would
also give a great competitive advantage to those larger banks with branches in
more than one state.
Additionally, it would seem inherently unfair for courts to hale a foreign
bank into South Carolina upon nothing more than mere issuance of a letter of
credit. The Bank engaged in no affirmative activity other than typing the
beneficiary's name onto the letter of credit. As the court also noted, the Bank
required that Southern Plastics present drafts on the letter of credit to its
Florida office rather than a South Carolina bank.45
In conclusion, it appears that the South Carolina Supreme Court
modernized the due process analysis that the state's courts must apply to find
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident. While the opinion provides little

39. Id. at 297 (citing Kulkov. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84,97-98 (1978); Shafferv. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977)).
40. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
41. Id. at 472.
42. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
43. Id. at 253 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
44. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
, _,423 S.E.2d 128,
45. Southern Plastics Co. v. Southern Commerce Bank, __ S.C.
130 (1992).
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insight into what types of relationships would qualify as satisfying "minimum
contacts," it clearly adopted all of the relevant federal case law in this area.
Therefore, Southern Plastics gives practitioners more cases from which to
make their respective arguments-perhaps the single most significant impact
of the case.
Keun Ho Bae

II. COURT FORCES THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO ADDRESS
INDIGENT CAPITAL DEFENSE
In Bailey v. State' the South Carolina Supreme Court enforced the
legislature's express intent by holding that the statutory cap on the allocation
of state funds for the defense of indigents in capital cases is merely a limitation
on state funds, not an absolute maximum allowable amount of compensation. 2
This holding further mandated that individual counties ultimately bear the
responsibility of the fees and costs in excess of the statutory cap.3 The Bailey
decision shocked county governments, leaving many of them unsure how to
adequately budget for these defense costs. 4 Ironically because Bailey created
such a financial problem for the counties, the supreme court forced the
legislature to address the longstanding problem of providing adequate funding
for South Carolina's indigent defense system.
In Bailey the appellants, the State of South Carolina and Aiken County,
challenged the Master in Equity's ruling that declared unconstitutional the
state's statutory scheme for paying both the attorney's fees and investigative
costs to defend indigent capital cases. 5 Two of the respondents had success-

1. _ S.C. _,424 S.E.2d 503 (1992).
2. Id. at
424 S.E.2d at 508.
3. Id. at,
424 S.E.2d at 508.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 32-35.
5. Bailey, _ S.C. at _
,424 S.E.2d at 505. The court summarized the payment scheme
as follows:
Section 16-3-26(B) provides that in all capital cases, two attorneys shall be
appointed to represent an indigent defendant, only one of whom may be the public
defender. Fees and costs for these attorneys cannot exceed $5,000 per trial from
funds appropriated for the defense of indigents. Section 16-3-26(C) provides a cap
of $2,500 from such funds for any expert and investigative services associated with
the capital trial. Section 17-3-50 provides that private counsel appointed pursuant to
the Defense of Indigents Act shall receive a fee of $15 per hour for in-court time and
$10 per hour for out-of-court time for their services, not to exceed the $5,000 cap.
Id. at
, 424 S.E.2d at 505 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-26(B)-(C), 17-3-50 (Law. Co-op.
1985 & Supp. 1992) (amended 1993)). As a result of Bailey, the General Assembly amended
most of these sections in the 1993 Annual AppropriationsAct. See infra text accompanying notes
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fully served as appointed counsel for an indigent defendant in a capital
prosecution case. The third respondent was a private investigator appointed
to assist in the defense. Through the efforts of these three respondents, the
6
trial court dismissed the charges against the accused prior to trial.
After the dismissal of charges, the successful attorneys and investigator
brought a declaratory judgment action in the circuit court for reimbursement
of the fees and costs of defending their indigent client in excess of the
statutory cap. 7 The circuit court referred the case to the Master in Equity
who found the statutory payment cap unconstitutional as violative of both a
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
and the Takings Clauses of the United States and South Carolina Constitutions.
The master awarded the attorneys and the investigator all associated out-ofpocket expenses. He also awarded the attorneys fees based on an hourly rate
of eighty-five dollars, while awarding the investigator fees at an hourly rate
of forty dollars. 8
The supreme court affirmed the master's decision with respect to the
private investigator's fees, but reversed the findings regarding the unconstitutionality of the statutory scheme and remanded the case for a redetermination
of reasonable attorney's fees and costs.' In so deciding, the court focused on
several important factors unique to the defense of indigents facing capital
charges.
First, after discussing the right to effective representation guaranteed to
indigent criminal defendants by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution,' 0 the court described in depth the unique nature of a defense
attorney's role in a death penalty case. The court recognized that in a capital
case "the attorney is charged with the awesome responsibility of defending a
person's life. A death penalty case, in and of itself, is an extraordinary
proceeding." 11 Additionally, the court acknowledged that the complex

54-60.
6. Bailey, - S.C. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 505.
7. Id. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 505. The attorneys spent a combined total of 362.05 hours of
out-of-court preparation for the case and 10 hours of in-court time. Further, they incurred
$1754.65 of out-of-pocket expenses. The investigator spent 264.25 hours preparing for the trial
and another $1,595.24 for miscellaneous expenses. Id. at _,424 S.E.2d at 505. Additionally,
James D. Bailey, one of the respondents, testified that of the four capital cases in Aiken County
since 1980, the court had appointed him to three. Id. at _ n.3, 424 S.E.2d at 508 n.3.
8. Id. at
424 S.E.2d at 505.
9. Id. at _
, 424 S.E.2d at 509; see also State v. Goolsby, 278 S.C. 52, 292 S.E.2d 180
(1982) (refusing to find statutory limits on capital defense reimbursement unconstitutional).
10. Bailey, _ S.C. at _
, 424 S.E.2d at 506. The court looked to the landmark holding
of an indigent's right to counsel in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and the
corresponding right to an effective defense guaranteed by Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
Id. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 506.
11. Bailey, - S.C. at ___, 424 S.E.2d at 506 (citing hite v. Board of County Comm'rs,
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bifurcated nature of a death penalty trial places great demands on an attorney
who knows that the defendant's life depends
in large part on the attorney's
2
performance.'
and
knowledge,
competence,
In addition to recognizing the personal demands involved in defending a
capital case, the court highlighted the severe implications of a poor defense.
The court realized that providing only nominal compensation to an appointed
defense attorney could result in the indigent client suffering harsh consequences.' 3 The court concluded its initial discussion of capital defense by stating:
"Given the extraordinary time, effort, and commitment required of defense
counsel in capital cases, it is unrealistic to expect that token compensation will
suffice in the future to provide an indigent defendant with the quality of legal
representation mandated by the United States Supreme Court."'"
Because the existing statutory cap on capital fees could not guarantee the
required constitutional level of effective assistance of counsel, the court
refused to interpret this cap as the maximum amount for reimbursement, but
instead interpreted the cap as the state's limits only.' 5 Therefore, the
linchpin of Bailey was the supreme court's determination that, in accord with

537 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 1989)).
12. Id. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 506-08. In particular, the court quoted at length from the
testimony of Stephen Bright, an attorney who defended three capital cases and who testified as
an expert for the respondents. Mr. Bright vividly described the personal stress, unique
challenges, and legal skills associated with defending a capital case. Apparently, the court
considered this testimony important and stated, "No challenge to Mr. Bright's testimony was
offered by either of the Appellants." Id. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 508.
13. Id. at _
, 424 S.E.2d at 506 (quoting Okeechobee County v. Jennings, 473 So. 2d
1314, 1318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (per curiarn) (upholding the constitutionalityof a statutory
fee cap, but certifying the issue to the Florida Supreme Court), rev'd, 491 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1986)
(finding the statutory cap to be unconstitutional "as applied to representation in extraordinary or
unusual cases")); see also Vivian Berger, The ChiropractorasBrain Surgeon:Defense Lawyering
in CapitalCases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245 (1990-91) (discussingthe inadequate
defense provided to most indigent capital defendants).
14. Bailey, _ S.C. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 508 (citing Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So.
2d 1109, 1114 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987)); see also Richard Klein, The
Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to Render the Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363 (1993) (discussing the national problem of inadequate compensation
for attorneys appointed to defend indigent cases); Anthony Paduano & Clive A. S. Smith, The
Unconscionabilityof Sub-Minimum Wages PaidAppointedCounselin CapitalCases,43 RUTGERS
L. REV. 281 (1991) (criticizing the statutory limitations on fees in most states for appointed
attorneys in capital cases); Albert L. Vreeland, II, Note, The Breath of the Unfee'd Lawyer:
Statutory Fee Limitations and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in CapitalLitigation, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 626 (1991) (arguing that statutory compensation limits for indigent capital defense
deprive defendants of their right to effective assistance).
15. Bailey, _ S.C. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 508. The supreme court recognized that South
Carolina's statutory hourly rates for appointed indigent defense were the lowest in the nation. Id.
at _ n.4., 424 S.E.2d at 508 n.4; see also Paduano & Smith, supra note 14, at 349-53
(comparing compensation schemes of 37 states).
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legislative intent, counties bear the ultimate responsibility for any excess cost
above the statutory cap paid from the state's Indigent Defense Fund.16 The
court based this determination on the express language in the General
Assembly's 1992 Annual Appropriations Act 7 and McMehan v. York County
Council,'8 a 1984 South Carolina Court of Appeals decision.' 9
The supreme court noted that in the 1992 Annual Appropriations Act the
legislature clearly declared counties responsible for any funds required in
excess of that budgeted for all indigent defense cases. The court stated:
State funding for the Defense of Indigents is set by the General
Assembly in the 'annual Appropriations Act, which contains the following
provision:
"It is the intent of the General Assembly that any expense incurred
in any county for the defense of indigents in excess of the county's
share of funds appropriated in this section... shall be borne by
20
the county."

The court then looked to the 1984 McMehan court of appeals' decision.
As in Bailey, the appellants in McMehan were appointed attorneys who
defended an indigent and requested payment from the county after finding their
county's appropriated portion of the state's Indigent Defense Fund exhausted.2 The county asserted that the court could not direct it to pay the fees.'
The court of appeals clearly disagreed, citing language in the 1979 Annual
Appropriations Act that mandated payment by the counties 3 and interpreting
the statutory law as only restricting payment from state funds.24 In McMehan

16. Bailey, - S.C. at __, 424 S.E.2d at 508 (citing McMehan v. York County Council,
281 S.C. 249, 315 S.E.2d 127 (Ct. App. 1984)). But see State v. Goolsby, 278 S.C. 52, 54,
292 S.E.2d 180, 181 (1982) (implying in dicta that state money might pay expenses in excess of
statutory limits in cases of "extraordinary circumstances").
17. No. 501, § 4.6, 1992 S.C. Acts 2519, 2578.
18. 281 S.C. 249, 315 S.E.2d 127 (Ct. App. 1984); see infra text accompanying notes 21-27.
19. Bailey, _ S.C. at ___
.424 S.E.2d at 505, 508.
20. Id. at __, 424 S.E.2d at 505 (quoting 1992 Annual Appropriations Act, No. 501, § 4.6,
1992 S.C. Acts 2519, 2578).
21. McMehan, 281 S.C. at 250, 315 S.E.2d at 128.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 252,315 S.E.2d at 129 (citing 1979 Annual AppropriationsAct, No. 199, § 4, 1979
S.C. Acts 524, 560). The 1979 Act contained language similar to that in the 1992 Act discussed
in Bailey, which required the counties to bear any excess expense for indigent defense incurred
above the county's appropriated funds.
24. Id. at 251-52, 315 S.E.2d 128-29. The McMehan court stated:
Section 17-3-70(b) provides that "upon receipt of written application from an
appointed counsel payment shall be made to him in the amount approved by the trial
judge, provided that no such payment shall be made after the funds appropriated for
that county or counties in the defender corporation area have been exhausted." The
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss1/5
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the court of appeals stated: "To the extent state appropriations are not
sufficient to pay for expenses incurred in any county for the defense of
indigents, the county council has a mandatory duty to provide and pay the
costs of indigent criminal defense. "' The court of appeals held that the
legislature definitely possessed "the authority to direct counties to support with
county funds the courts of the unified system."26 Therefore, the McMehan
court ordered the county council to pay the attorneys, while specifically
recognizing that the requested fees were within the "state schedule of fees
which are modest."27
Whereas the McMehan court mandated payment of fees that were within
the limits of the state's payment scheme, the Bailey court stated that the
statutory schedule applies only to the state's appropriated funds. The supreme
court held "that the hourly rates and cap provided in sections 16-3-26 and 173-50 are not absolute allowances in capital cases, but merely limitations upon
the State's funds allocated for the Defense of Indigents. It then necessarily
falls upon the county to supplement as required in a given case."28 Therefore, the court held that an attorney requesting compensation in excess of the
statutory limits could be reimbursed by the county at a rate higher than the
statutory schedule.29 The supreme court concluded that the indigent-defense
attorney's fee should not be based on the actual market rate, but instead on a
"reasonable, but lesser rate. "30 The court stated that the trial judge must
determine this compensation rate, and any associated expenses, at the
conclusion of each trial.31
The Bailey decision sent shock waves through the counties.3 2 With the
defense of a capital case estimated to cost approximately $61,000 per trial,"u

restrictionon payment is addressed to state appropriatedfunds. The restrictionon
payment would not apply to funds appropriatedfor this purpose by a county

government.
Id. at 251, 315 S.E.2d at 128-29 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-70(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976)).
25. Id. at 252, 315 S.E.2d at 129.
26. McMehan, 281 S.C. at 253, 315 S.E.2d at 129 (citing Kramer v. County Council, 277
S.C. 71, 282 S.E.2d 850 (1981) (per curiam)).
27. Id. at 253, 315 S.E.2d at 130.
28. Bailey, _ S.C. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 508 (citing McMehan, 281 S.C. 249, 315 S.E.2d
127).
29. Id. at
,424 S.E.2d at 508.
30. Id. at
, 424 S.E.2d at 508; see also White v. Board of County Comm'rs, 537 So. 2d
1376, 1379 (Fla. 1989) (stating that a reasonable rate will effectively "balance the state's
constitutional obligation and the attorney's ethical obligation").
31. Bailey, _

S.C. at __, 424 S.E.2d at 508-09.

32. See Lolo Pendergrast, S.C. Counties Hit with Legal Bills of Poor Charged in Capital
Cases, THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 29, 1993, at IA; Subcommittee's Members Heed
Agency's Pleas, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Feb. 18, 1993, at 6B.
33. Pendergrast, supra note 32 (citing a South Carolina Bar estimate).
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many small, rural counties simply lack the money to pay for the defense of a
single indigent capital case, and the larger counties most likely have not
budgeted adequate funds for potential capital cases. The reality of several
death penalty cases in one county during the same fiscal year could indeed
have severe financial implications." Not only is it difficult for the counties
to adequately budget for the unpredictable onset of a capital case, but it is also
difficult to justify such an expenditure to their constituents who want improved
roads, new libraries, and better law enforcement. As Mike Cone, the
Executive Director of the South Carolina Association of Counties, stated: "The
Bailey decision really has the potential to bankrupt counties in South Carolina,
particularly the small, rural counties." 35
In addition to the budgetary problem, counties encounter problems with
the somewhat arbitrary manner by which they must pay these expenses. The
county where the solicitor brings capital charges pays the defense costs merely
because the defendant committed that crime within that county's jurisdiction.
For example, Jasper County recently faced legal fees in defending two capital
indigent defendants-neither of whom were Jasper County residents. One of
the cases involved the tragic murder on Interstate 95 of South Carolina
Highway Patrolman Mark Coates.3 6 Although the gruesome facts of this case
clearly warranted prosecution and required a competent and skillful defense
attorney, it did not seem equitable to require Jasper County to pay the majority
of the legal bills and all of the medical expenses for the indigent defendant
simply because the crime occurred along the stretch of the interstate that cuts
through the county." Finally, it is difficult to understand why the legislature
requires a county to pay the expenses of a trial in which the county is not even
a named party or an included decision maker in the prosecution process.3
Realizing the possible inequities of its holding in Bailey, the supreme court
called on the legislature to act:

34. See Lisa Greene, Bar Argues for More Indigent Defense Pay, THE STATE (Columbia,
S.C.), Mar. 10, 1993, at 1B ("Local government officials across the state have said that if they're
forced to pay those costs, it could mean financial disaster, especially for smaller counties.").
35. Lisa Greene, Death PenaltyBecoming a Dollars-and-CentsIssue, THE STATE (Columbia,
S.C.), Feb. 9, 1993, at lB.
36. See JasperCounty To Solicitor:Don'tSeek Death Penalty, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.),
Feb. 6, 1993, at 3B.
37. Cf. id. The defendant was shot in the incident, and his combined legal and medical fees
approximated $250,000-about 6% of Jasper County's annual budget of $4,500,000. See
Pendergrast, supra note 32.
38. Subsequent to Bailey, a circuit judge granted Lexington County's request for a hearing
to decide whether to approve trial funds requested by an appointed capital defense attorney.
However, the defense attorney refused to discuss the expenses at the hearing because doing so
could reveal his trial strategy. Lisa Greene, Death-Defense Cost Impasse Stands, THE STATE
(Columbia, S.C.), May 29, 1993, at lB.
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We recognize that the current system may not be the most equitable in
providing compensation to appointed attorneys in capital cases. This is
especially true when capital murder occurs within those counties least able
to bear such costs. However, any modification of the present system must
be addressed to the General Assembly, which, thus far, has contributed
clearly inadequate funding for the defense of indigents.39
The system mandated by the legislature and enforced in Bailey created
tension between state and county officials. The state's obligation to provide
effective assistance to all indigents is unquestionably an essential and
fundamental constitutional requirement.4 ° However, county officials must
spend the county funds as prudently as possible. Obviously, the citizens and
elected county officials do not think they should bear the high fees of
defending a capital indigent being prosecuted exclusively by a state official.
Additionally, the citizens will no doubt balk at the possibility of the county's
raising taxes in order to fund death penalty defenses. 41
On the other hand, the state solicitor's duty is to successfully prosecute.
persons under the state's criminal law.42 Clearly, the merits of a case should
govern the solicitor's decision to proceed in a capital case, not the potential
cost of the defense or a public outcry concerning expenses.43 The tension
between the county officials and the state solicitors over these potential costs
is a direct result of the legislative system.
Faced with these potentially unbudgeted excessive costs, some counties
believe they should have more input as to whether the state solicitor seeks the
death penalty in their county. For example, Jasper County sued the state and
local prosecutors to prevent them from seeking the death penalty in the case
of Patrolman Coates.' In the pleadings, the Jasper County Council asked for
the final say on whether the state's prosecutor could pursue the death penalty
in any case brought within the county.45
Even if a county could find adequate legal grounds to prevent a state
solicitor from seeking the death penalty, that success may not make a
difference because of the current trend in the state's lower courts to expand the

39. Bailey, _ S.C. at __, 424 S.E.2d at 509. For a similar plea for the Florida legislature
to improve its capital defense funding system, see White v. Board of County Comm'rs, 537 So.
2d 1376, 1380-81 (Fla. 1989) (Overton, J., concurring).
40. Bailey, _ S.C. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 506; see supra text accompanying note 10.
41. See Martin Melendy,Death TrialDefenseTo Cost$20,000, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.),
Jan. 5, 1993, at IB; Pendergrast, supra note 32.
42. See S.C. CONST. art. V, § 24; S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-7-320 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
43. See Lolo Pendergrast, County To Pick Up Tab ForExtra Defense Fees, THE CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Feb. 2, 1993, at 1Y.
44. JasperSeeks Out on Death Penalty Cases,THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Apr. 30, 1993,
at 5B.
45. Id.
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holding in Bailey. First, several of the state's circuit court judges have
interpreted Bailey as requiring counties to pay the defense fees of noncapital
indigent cases.46 However, the actual language of the Bailey opinion does
not strongly support such an extension. As previously discussed, the court
continuously differentiated capital cases as unique.47 Further, the court's
intent to narrowly apply the Bailey holding to capital cases appears in the
following language:
As has been emphasized in this opinion, the awesome burden placed
upon an attorney appointed to represent a capital case defendant is
incomparably greaterthan in a non-capital case. The issue of compensation for attorneys appointed to non-capital
cases is not before the Court,
48
and we express no opinion at this time.
The court expressly refused to address the compensation of attorneys appointed
to noncapital cases.49
In addition to extending Bailey to noncapital cases, some circuit court
judges are applying it retroactively, which allows defense attorneys to collect
past-due fees and to increase compensation amounts for pre-Bailey cases.5 0
However, an argument could also be made against Bailey's retroactive
application. Some language in the Bailey opinion implies that the trial judge's
discretion plays an important role in the decision whether to grant an
attorney's request for fees and expenses above the statutory limit, and as such,
the decision should be made at the conclusion of the trial. 5' These extensions
of Bailey by the state's lower courts only further exacerbate the budgetary
problems and uncertainty the counties face.
46. See Lisa Greene, Lawyers Pushingfor Overhaul of State's PublicDefense System, THE
STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Feb. 14, 1993, at 1B (discussing a circuit judge's order to Spartanburg
County to pay the defense costs for representing indigents accused of rape and drug charges).
47. See supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
48. Bailey, _ S.C. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 509 (emphasis added).
49. Indeed, the legislature may have minimized the problem by reducing the need to extend
Bailey to noncapital cases in the 1993 Annual Appropriations Act which increased the cap for
funding the defense of indigent noncapital cases to $3,500 for felonies and $1,000 for
misdemeanors. See 1993 Annual Appropriations Act, No. 164, § 45(F), 1993 S.C. Acts 531,
1220-21 (amending S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-50 (Law. Co-op. 1985)).
50. See, e.g., Twila Decker, Lexington Co. Appeals Death Defense Payment, THE STATE
(Columbia, S.C.), Jan. 26, 1993, at 3B; cf. Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct.
2510 (1993) (requiring retroactive application of the Court's prior decision to pay back taxes to
federal retirees in Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989)).
51. Bailey, _ S.C. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 508. The court stated that the determination of
the reasonable rate of compensation, "which shall be made at the conclusion of the trial, is within
the sound discretion of the trial judge. Moreover, a determination of an attorney's costs and
expenses for trial preparation shall also be made within the discretion of the trial judge." Id. at
-, 424 S.E.2d at 508.
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The system mandated by the legislature and interpreted by Bailey needed
modification. The court placed the burden on the legislature to change the
system, 52 and apparently the legislature heard either the court's call or the
subsequent outcry of the counties.1 3 In June of 1993, the General Assembly
added several provisions to the 1993 Annual Appropriations Act that should
substantially improve the state's indigent defense system. 4
This Appropriations Act created a seven member "Commission on
Indigent Defense" to assist the court with the appointment of attorneys in
indigent capital cases and to supervise the disbursement of the state's indigent
defense funds.5 5 Additionally, the Act increased the schedule rates and cap
for fees and expenses allowed to private attorneys providing indigent defense.
It raised the maximum attorney fee in a capital case to $25,000 with an hourly
rate of $50 for out-of-court time and $75 for in-court time.5 6 The Act
provides a new procedure to be followed to exceed these caps if the court
certifies such additional payment is necessary for effective assistance of
counsel, and if the services provided were "reasonably and necessarily
incurred." 57 The Act requires that in capital cases without a conflict, the
public defender's office or an available contract public defender attorney must
be used before the court requests assistance from the Office of Indigent
5
Defense. 1
To fund the Commission and these fee increases, the Appropriations Act
imposes a ten percent surcharge on most fines assessed in the lower courts and
a twenty-five dollar application fee for persons using the Public Defender's
Office. 5 9 The Act not only greatly increases the amount of funding for
capital defense, but it also sets up an exclusive fund for death penalty cases.
Half of the revenue raised from the ten percent surcharge must be deposited
directly into a Death Penalty Trial Fund until that fund reaches $1,675,000. °

52. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; see also Lisa Greene, ChiefJusticePleadsfor
GreaterFunding, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Feb. 18, 1993, at 3B (discussing South Carolina
Chief Justice Harwell's plea to the legislature for increased funding for the state's judiciary
system).
53. See Colette Baxley, Rulings on Lawyers' Pay Prompt Outcry, THE CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Feb. 18, 1993, at 1C.
54. See 1993 Annual Appropriations Act, No. 164, § 45, 1993 S.C. Acts 531, 1216-21.
55. Id. § 45(C), at 1216-17 (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-3-310 to -330).
56. Id. § 45(D), at 1218 (amending S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1992)). Note, however, that the limit on expert or investigative services remains at an
unrealistically low limit of $2,500. Id.
57. Id. (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26(D)).
58. Id. (amending S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992)).
59. 1993 Annual Appropriations Act, No. 164, § 45(A), 1993 S.C. Acts 531, 1216 (to be
codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-1-213); id. § 45(E), at 1219-20 (amending S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 17-3-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992)).
60. Id. § 14.1, at 619-20.
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Clearly these recent changes will alleviate the financial problems of the
counties and will help ensure that a capital defendant receives effective
assistance of counsel. However, with the high cost of capital cases, it is still
probable that the counties will continue to encounter some financial liability
if the revenue to support the Office of Indigent Defense fails to generate as
much money as projected or is quickly exhausted. 6
The Bailey decision has refocused attention on the state's public defender
system. For a long time, politicians, judges, and attorneys have advocated a
complete overhaul of the indigent defense system.62 The South Carolina Bar
has repeatedly called for a sixteen-circuit, state-wide public defender system
that would mirror the current solicitor system.63 The Bar initially recommended this system in 1988, 4 and with the impact of Bailey, the counties
appear to more fully support this system.65 Ideally, the proposed circuit
system would save money because the public defenders would replace the
private appointed attorneys.'
However, some opposition to the creation of a state-wide public defender
system exists. Opponents argue that it would only increase the state's
bureaucracy.6' Further, a state-wide public defender system might not be
flexible enough to handle the unpredictable nature of capital cases. For
example, a single public defender in a geographic circuit may be unable to
adequately handle several concurrent capital cases, while a neighboring public
defender could sit idle if there were no pending capital cases. Finally, the
single circuit public defender could not simultaneously represent several capital
co-defendants; therefore, the need for appointed private attorneys would still
exist in conflict cases.68
In addition to creating a state-wide public defender system, other
lawmakers have advocated a contract system, much like the one utilized in

61. See id. § 14.3, at 620. (Counties still remain ultimately liable for any expense incurred
in excess of the county's appropriated share of indigent funds.).
62. See Greene, supra note 34.
63. See Lisa Greene, Indigent Defense Funds at Stake, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), May
28, 1993, at lB.
64. See id.
65. See Lisa Greene, Indigent Defense Increased, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), June 23,
1993, at 2B.
66. See Greene, supra note 63. Because state law requires providing every capital defendant
with two attorneys, even with a circuit public defender system, a need for an additional courtappointed attorney would still exist. See 1993 Annual Appropriations Act, No. 164, § 45(D),
1993 S.C. Acts 531, 1218 (amending S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992)).
67. See Greene, supra note 46.
68. See 1993 Annual Appropriations Act, No. 164, § 45(D), 1993 S.C. Acts 531, 1218
(amending S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992), but still requiring two
attorneys to defend every capital case).
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Under a contract system, the county contracts with

local defense lawyers to provide indigent defense on a case-by-case basis.7'
Arguably, this system's advantages lie in its low cost, minimal bureaucracy,
and increased flexibility. Adversaries of the contract system criticize it as
providing too little accountability or supervision over the contract attorneys. 7'
Further, although the contract system could reduce the fees for indigent
defense in noncapital cases, the potential for a high contract price to defend
a capital case would still exist as the market price could be determinative.
Although both of these systems appear to be efficient means of providing
capital indigent defense, the more efficient system might be a combination of
the best attributes of both proposals to create a state "capital defense team."
In October of 1992, faced with the same problems of funding indigent capital
defense, Georgia created the "Office of Multicounty Public Defender,"72 to
serve all counties and "to undertake the defense of all indigent persons charged
with a capital felony for which the death penalty is being sought."" Under
this system, the Georgia Indigent Defense Council appoints a Multicounty
Public Defender,74 who hires other attorneys and a staff as needed. 5 As
long as funds remain available, the Multicounty Public Defender Office
assumes the defense of the capital indigent from the trial court to any
subsequent appeals to the Georgia Supreme Court.76 If sufficient funds are

not available, Georgia resorts to an appointed system under which the indicting
county pays the defense costs. 7
Looking to Georgia's system, South Carolina could create a capital
defense team comprised of approximately fifteen to twenty attorneys
exclusively charged with handling the state's death penalty cases. The
advantages of such a team are numerous. First, by repeatedly handling only
capital cases, the team attorneys would quickly acquire the requisite expertise
to efficiently perform capital defense work because they would be very
familiar with the complex constitutional law involved in a capital case.7"

69. See Greene, supra note 46.

70. See id.
71. See id.
72. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-12-90 to -97 (Michie Supp. 1993); see also Mark Curriden, Office
to Aid in CapitalCases:Better Defensefor Poor Targeted, THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Oct.
7, 1992, at C2 (discussing the newly created office).
73. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-91 (Michie Supp. 1993).
74. Id. § 17-12-93.
75. Id. § 17-12-96.
76. Id. § 17-12-97(c). The county public defenderhas the option to assume sole responsibility
of representing the capital defendant. Id. § 17-12-97(a).
77. See id. §§ 17-12-97(b), -60(a)-(b).
78. See Bailey, _ S.C. at _, 424 S.E.2d at 506 (discussing the requirements that a capital
defense attorney be familiar with the "constantly new interpretations of constitutional law").
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Second, hiring salaried lawyers and a small permanent staff would cost the
state less than paying the hourly fees of the private court-appointed attorneys.
Money currently spent on those fees would be more than adequate to provide
a competitive annual salary for the capital team members, and future revenue
accumulated for the Death Penalty Trial Fund could be used to finance the
team. Third, the team's mobility would allow it to be more flexible in
responding to the unpredictable nature of capital cases wherever the cases
arise. Finally, the state would assume sole control over the purse-strings of
both the prosecution and defense of capital cases, thereby eliminating the
tension between county and the state.
One hopes that the creation of the Office of Indigent Defense signifies the
first in a series of steps to revamp the state's indigent defense system." The
legislature's recent actions made several noteworthy improvements in the
capital indigent defense payment system. Clearly, however, room for more
improvement exists."0 Although the court's decision in Bailey initially
imposed a great financial burden on the counties, it also forced the legislature
to address the serious problem of inadequate compensation in indigent capital
cases.
Mark C. Fava

III. VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE'S MALE-ONLY ADMISSION
POLICY VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

In United States v. Virginia' the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the male-only admissions policy of Virginia Military Institute (VMI)2
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 The
VMI decision potentially signals the end of state funding to schools which only
admit one sex because the Fourth Circuit stopped just short of ordering VMI
to admit women. In a creative opinion, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case
to the district court, giving the state of Virginia the opportunity to develop an
adequate alternative plan.4 The Fourth Circuit stated:
79. See Greene, supra note 65.
80. See IndigentDefense Fund Needs Some Fine-Tuning, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), July
5, 1993, at 10A.
1. 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
2. VMI is a state supported institution of higher education located in Lexington, Virginia. Id.
at 892. The Citadel, located in Charleston, South Carolina, is the only other all-male state
supported college in the United States. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1420.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
4. Virginia, 976 F.2d at 900. The district court was to oversee the formation, implementa-
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[WMe do not mean to suggest the specific remedial course that the
Commonwealth should or must follow hereafter. Rather, we remand the
case to the district court to give to the Commonwealth the responsibility
to select a course it chooses, so long as the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment are satisfied. Consistent therewith, the Commonwealth might
properly decide to admit women to VMI and adjust the program to
implement that choice, or it might establish parallel institutions or parallel
programs, or it might abandon state support of VMI, leaving VMI the
option to pursue its own policies as a private institution. While it is not
ours to determine, there might be other more creative options or combinations. 5
The VMI case arose when the United States Department of Justice filed
suit on behalf of a female high school student who was refused admission to
VMI. 6 The Justice Department sued Virginia and VMI claiming violations of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the principles
found in the Supreme Court's decision in Mississippi University of Women v.
Hogan.7
In Hogan the United States Supreme Court held that "a state statute that
excludes males from enrolling in a state-supported . . . school violates the
Equal Protection Clause."' Although this language by itself seems to outlaw
any state-supported single-sex school or college, such an interpretation is too
extreme. 9 Accordingly, a discussion of Hogan helps to provide a better
understanding of the VMI decision.
The plaintiff in Hogan was a male who wanted to enroll at Mississippi
University for Women, an all-female, state-supported, nursing school. Hogan
was denied admission to MUW because of his sex; consequently, he sued the
school claiming that the all-female admissions policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause.'0
The Hogan Court applied the intermediate scrutiny test." Intermediate

tion, and approval of an alternative plan. Id. Because of this remand, the Supreme Court denied
Virginia's petition for certiorari because a final judgment had not been rendered. Virginia
Military Inst. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993). In an opinion respecting the denial of
the petition for certiorari, Justice Scalia intimated that the Court might be willing to hear
arguments on the issue once a final judgment was entered. Id. at 2432.
5. Virginia, 976 F.2d at 900.
6. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1408.
7. Id. (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)).
8. Id. at 719.
9. Even the government in the VMI case conceded that it was not their "'position that the
Fourteenth Amendment embodies a per se bar to public single-sex education.'" Virginia, 976
F.2d at 898 (quoting Brief of Government).
10. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 720-21.
11. Id. at 724. Intermediate level or mid-tier scrutiny was first articulated in Craig v. Boren,
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level scrutiny applies in cases involving allegations of gender discrimination
and requires a showing "that the classification serves 'important governmental
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives.'" 2
In Hogan, the State asserted that its affirmative action attempt to
compensate women for past discrimination was an important governmental
objective.1 3 The State further argued that the female-only admissions policy,
or discriminating against men, was substantially related to the achievement of
its compensatory objective. 4 The Court held that the State failed both parts
of the intermediate scrutiny test.'5 Accordingly, the Court invalidated
Mississippi University's policy of denying admission to males as violative of
the Equal Protection Clause.' 6
The facts of Hogan are similar to those of the VMI case. On behalf of
the female denied admission by VMI, the Justice Department challenged
VMI's all-male admissions policy as discriminatory and not substantially

429 U.S. 190 (1976), and is "now universally employed in sex discrimination cases based on the
equal protection clause." Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1410 n.5. Craig involved a challenge to an
Oklahoma statute which prohibited the sale of beer to males under the age of 21, but allowed
females to buy beer at the age of 18. The Court held that classifications by gender must be
substantially related to the achievement of important governmental objectives. Craig, 429 U.S.
at 197. Applying this new mid-tier level of scrutiny, the Court held the statute unconstitutional.
Id. at 210.
Prior to Craig, the court used only two levels of scrutiny-low-level and strict-in equal
protection cases. Low-level scrutiny, commonly used in cases involving alleged discrimination
based on economic factors, requires only that a classificationbe rationally related to a legitimate
governmental objective. See, e.g, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
442-47 (1985) (applying intermediate level scrutiny to a classification of the mentally retarded
by a zoning ordinance). Strict scrutiny, typically used in cases involving alleged racial
discrimination, requires a showing that the classification is necessary for the achievement of a
compelling governmental objective. See, e.g, Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984)
(applying strict scrutiny to a Florida anti-miscegenation statute).
12. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150
(1980)); accord Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
In other words, the test consists of the following two parts: (1) The defendant must define an
important governmental objective. Then, if the objective is indeed deemed important, (2) the
defendant must show that the discriminatory acts complained of substantially relate to the
achievement of that important governmental objective.
13. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 727. The State described the objective as "educational affirmative
action." Id.
14. See id. at 730.

15. Id. at 731. The court stated: "[C]onsidering both the asserted [government] interest and
the relationship between the interest and the methods used by the State, we conclude that the State
has fallen far short of establishing the 'exceedingly persuasive justification' needed to sustain the
gender-based classification." Id.
16. Id.
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related to any important governmental objective. 7 Thus, the Commonwealth
of Virginia incurred the burden of satisfying the two prongs of the intermediate scrutiny test.
First, Virginia had to specify an important governmental objective served
by VMI's admissions policy. Then, once the court accepted the stated
objective as important, Virginia had to show that refusing to admit women was
substantially related to that objective.
Virginia contended that VMI's admission policy enhanced educational
diversity, an important governmental objective."8 With little discussion, the
Fourth Circuit seemingly accepted Virginia's educational diversity argument "9
as satisfying the first prong of the intermediate scrutiny test.20 Therefore, the
Fourth Circuit concentrated predominately on the second prong of the
intermediate scrutiny test.2"
If VMI's male-only admissions policy is in furtherance of a state policy
of "diversity," the explanation of how the policy is furthered by affording
a unique educational benefit only to males is lacking. A policy of diversity
which aims to provide an array of educational opportunities, including
single-gender institutions, must do more than favor one gender. More-

17. Virginia, 976 F.2d at 892.
18. Id. at 896-98. In 1990 a commission established by the Virginia legislature reported "that
the hallmarks of Virginia higher education, 'autonomy and diversity,' should be maintained." Id.
at 899. Originally, the district court accepted this objective as "important" and, therefore
concluded that VMI'g admission policy furthered educational diversity. Virginia, 766 F. Supp.
at 1415.
19. See Virginia, 976 F.2d at 898-99. However, the court did imply that the "educational
diversity" argument lost force by stating:
[A]t one time most of Virginia's institutions of higher learning were single-sex,
including four all-female institutions. Today, all but VMI are coeducational. If VMI
thus remains male in furtherance of the state's policy of diversity, which includes
diversity in gender, did the decisions of the other institutions violate state policy by
moving uniformly to coeducation?
Id. at 899.
20. The fact that the court glossed over the first prong of the test is possibly due to the
ambiguous nature of the intermediate scrutiny test. The test has been criticized from its
inception. For example, in Craig v. Boren Justice Rehnquist stated in his dissent:
I would think we have had enough difficulty with the two standards of review which
our cases have recognized ... so as to counsel weightily against the insertion of still
another "standard" between those two. How is this Court to divine what objectives
are important? How is it to determine whether a particular law is "substantially"
related to the achievement of such objective, rather than related in some other way
to its achievement? Both of the phrases used are so diaphanous and elastic as to
invite subjective judicial preferences or prejudices ....
429 U.S. 190, 220-21 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
21. However, the two parts of the test are equally ambiguous and neither is easy to define.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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over, if responsibility for implementing diversity has somehow been
delegated to an individual institution, no explanation is apparent as to how
one institution with autonomy, but with no authority over any other state
institution, can give effect to a state policy of diversity among institutions.22
The Fourth Circuit concluded that VMI had "not adequately explained
how the maintenance of one single-gender institution gives effect to, or
establishes the existence of, the governmental objective advanced to support
VMI's admissions policy, a desire for educational diversity. "I
This result predictably and logically followed from the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Hogan. After Hogan, VMI and other state-supported, single-sex
schools surely recognized the inevitability of the day when a member of the
excluded sex would file suit seeking admission to their institution. Almost as
a precursor, the Hogan Court warned as follows:
Although the test for determining the validity of a gender-based
classification is straightforward, it must be applied free of fixed notions

concerning the roles and abilities of males and females. Care must be
taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic
and stereotypic notions.
The purpose of requiring [a] close relationship [between the objective and
its means of achievement] is to assure that the validity of a classification
is determined through reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical
application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper
roles of men and women. 24
The above passage clearly announces that discriminatory classifications
that prolong gender stereotypes will receive closer scrutiny, thereby rendering
them more difficult to justify. 25 Both Hogan and the VMI case involved this

22. Virginia, 976 P.2d at 899.

23. Id. at 899-900.
24. Mississippi Univ. of Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,724-26 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
25. This sentiment against existing stereotypes appeared even before the advent ofintermediate
level scrutiny. E.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). In Stanton a Utah law terminated
the obligation to pay child support for female children once the child turned eighteen. However,
the obligation to pay child support for male children continued until the child turned twenty-one.
This distinction arose from the idea that "girls tend to mature earlier than boys; and that females
tend to marry earlier than males." Id. at 14. Therefore, females left home sooner than males and
did not continue their education as long as males. Hence, the parents of female children did not
need child support as long as the parents of male children. The Court struck down the Utah
statute stating that "if the female is not to be supported so long as the male, she hardly can be
expected to attend school as long as he does, and bringing her education to an end earlier
coincides with the role-typing society has long imposed." Id. at 15.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss1/5
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type of gender discrimination. Mississippi excluded males from the traditionally female profession of nursing, while Virginia excluded females from the
traditionally male profession of soldiering. In both cases, the burden of
satisfying the two prongs of intermediate scrutiny proved too demanding for
the defendant schools. In fact, after the VMI decision, one can hardly imagine
a scenario in which a gender discriminatory practice would be sufficiently
related to an important governmental purpose to pass constitutional muster
under mid-level scrutiny.
Nonetheless, Virginia succeeded in gaining the court's acceptance of its
important governmental purpose, educational diversity.26 However, the
educational diversity objective made satisfying the second prong of the
intermediate scrutiny test all the more exacting.
Obviously, maintaining VMI's status quo advances the goal of educational
diversity because it provides a unique educational option. However, only male
citizens can take advantage of the option and benefit from the increased
diversity. The Fourth Circuit stated that the "decisive question in this case
therefore transforms to one of why the Commonwealth of Virginia offers the
opportunity only to men."'27 Virginia attempted to answer this question by
focusing the court's attention on the unique nature of VMI's educational
experience' and how it could only be preserved effectively if VMI remained
an all-male institution.29 However, Virginia's argument is flawed because it
requires VMI's discrimination against women to continue so that VMI's unique
characteristics will not be destroyed, thereby fostering perpetual discrimination
against women. The Fourth Circuit was somewhat receptive to this argument,
agreeing with the district court that the
changes necessary to accommodate coeducation would tear at the fabric of
VMI's unique methodology ....
[I]f a court were to require the
admission of women to VMI to give them access to this unique
methodology, the decision would deny those women the very opportunity
they sought because the unique characteristics of VMI's program would be
destroyed by coeducation. The Catch-22 is that women are denied the
opportunity when excluded from VMI and cannot be given the opportunity
by admitting them, because the change caused by their admission would
30
destroy the opportunity.

26. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
27. Virginia, 976 F.2d at 898.
28. Id. at 893 ("VMI's educational method emphasizes physical rigor, mental stress, absolute
equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination of
values.") For a detailed discussion of VMI's educational process, see Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at
1421-32.
29. Virginia, 976 F.2d at 898-900.
30. Id. at 897 (footnote omitted).
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The Fourth Circuit stated that Virginia adequately defended its position
that VMI was a unique institution which fulfilled its mission of producing
citizen soldiers. 3 However, Virginia did not proclaim the production of
citizen soldiers as its "important governmental objective." The Fourth Circuit
explained that "[w]hile VMI's institutional mission justifies a single-sex
program, the Commonwealth of Virginia has not revealed a policy that
explains why it offers the unique benefit of VMI's type of education and
training to men and not to women. "32
While the Fourth Circuit was careful not to categorically denounce
single-sex education, the VMI decision implies that the only way for a statesupported, single-sex school to survive is for the state to fund a parallel
institution for the opposite sex, which is most likely not a realistic alterna34
tive.33 Equally impractical is the abandonment of state funding to VMI.
After an examination of the .Fourth Circuit's imaginative alternatives, one
eventually must face the reality of the VMI decision. Unless the Supreme
Court intervenes, schools like VMI and the Citadel will be forced to choose
between what they would consider two equally unattractive alternatives-admit
women or close.
Scott B. Garrett

IV. FOURTH CIRCUIT APPLIES POWERS V. OHIO

In United States v. Malindez'- the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that Powers v. Ohio2 did not eliminate the requirement that a prima facie case
of purposeful discrimination must be established by a party raising a Batson
v. Kentucky' objection to opposing counsel's peremptory challenges.4

31. Id. at 899. In fact, "[t]he parties agree[d] that VMI offers a unique combination of
education and training that makes a positive contribution offered by no other institution." Id. at
898 (footnote omitted).
32. Id. at 898.
33. While some interest does exist among females in attending military institutions, it is
unlikely that the demand is sufficient to justify an all-female military school. During the two
years prior to this suit, VMI received only 300 inquiries from females. Id. at 894.
34. VMI receives more than $10,000,000 in financial support each year from Virginia. It is
unlikely that enough private support could be generated to replace such a vast sum on an annual
basis.
1. 962 F.2d 332 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 215 (1992).
2. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991) (holding that a criminal defendant may object to race-based
peremptory challenges regardless of whether the defendant and the stricken jurors share the same
race).
3. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In this landmark decision, the Court held that under the Equal
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Malindez is a significant decision for two reasons. First, the Fourth Circuit
explains that while Powers allows a criminal defendant to object to the
exclusion of a juror regardless of the juror's race, it did not negate the
objecting party's duty to first establish a prima facie case. Second, Malindez
suggests that objecting parties may face a higher evidentiary burden when
attempting to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on the
exclusion of jurors of a race different than the defendant. 5 Thus, while
Malindez reaffirms the continued application of the prima facie case requirement in the Fourth Circuit, it raises new evidentiary questions regarding this
requirement.
In Malindez, a grand jury indicted Celso Malindez on two counts of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine.6 At trial, Malindez
and codefendant Alberto Davila claimed that the Government's use of
peremptory challenges was racially motivated and in violation of Batson.7
The district court overruled the defendants' objection on the grounds that the
defendants, both Hispanics, lacked standing under Batson to object to
peremptory challenges of four black venireman.8 The district court convicted
Malindez on both counts. 9
On April 9, 1991, Malindez moved for a new trial on the basis of Powers
v. Ohio,"° which was decided eight days earlier." The holding in Powers,
allowing defendants of any race to object to the race-based exclusions of
potential jurors,' empowered Malindez with standing to object to the
Protection Clause a prosecutor may not use peremptory challenges to strike otherwise qualified
potential jurors solely on the basis of their race. Id. at 97-98. The Batson Court set up a burden
shifting scheme in which the defendant, upon objecting to the peremptory challenge, must
establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Id. at 96-97. If the defendant make
this prima fac;e showing, then the burden shifts to the state to present race-neutral explanations
for its peremptory challenges. Id. at 97-98. The trial judge then determines whether the State
successfully rebutted the defendant's prima facie case or whether a Batson violation occurred.
Id. at 98.
4. Malindez, 962 F.2d at 332.
5. For example, a white defendant who objects to the exclusion of black veniremen might
require more evidence to establish a prima facie case than a black defendant who objects to the
striking of black veniremen. See id. at 334 (noting that "'[r]acial identity between the defendant
and the excused person' may 'provide one of the easier cases to establish ... a prima facie case
...that wrongful discrimination has occurred'" (quoting Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1373-74)).
6. Id. at 332. The crime of conspiracy to possess a controlled substance with intent to
distribute is codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1988).
7. Malindez, 962 F.2d at 333. Using all available peremptory challenges, the Government
struck four blacks and four whites from the group of prospectivdjurors. Ultimately, three black
jurors served on the twelve member jury. Id. at 332-33.
8. Id. at 333.
9. Id.

10. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
11. Malindez, 962 F.2d at 333.
12. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1373-74. The Powers Court reasoned that a defendant, regardless
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prosecutor's peremptory challenges of four black jurors in his case. Malindez

asserted that following Powers, the challenge of any minority juror presumes
purposeful discrimination, and therefore, requires the Government to present
3 Malindez
a race-neutral reason every time it strikes a minority venireman. 1
concluded that Powers eliminated the prima facie case requirement originally
established in Batson. 4 The district court rejected this assertion and denied
Malindez's motion for a new trial because he had failed to meet the prima
facie case requirement. 5 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 16
The Fourth Circuit articulated several reasons why the prima facie
requirement still exists. First, the Powers Court neither explicitly nor
implicitly addressed the validity of the prima facie case requirement. 17
However, the Malindez court noted that "the [Powers] Court clearly
contemplated that the prima facie case requirement of Batson would still have
to be satisfied after its decision."" Specifically, Powers expressly indicates
that it may be easier for defendants to establish a prima facie case when they
share the same race as the excluded juror. 19
Second, the Malindez court noted that Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co.,2 decided two months after Powers, was remanded to the district court
solely to determine whether the defendant had satisfied the prima facie case
requirement. 2' Therefore, reasoned the Malindez court, if Powers truly
eliminated the prima facie case requirement, as Malindez asserted, then the

of race, has a common interest with the excluded juror to rid the selection process of racial
discrimination. Id. at 1373. The Court further stated that "[t]o bar petitioner's claim because his
race differs from that of the excluded jurors would be to condone the arbitrary exclusion of
citizens from the duty, honor, and privilege of jury service." Id.
13. Malindez, 962 F.2d at 333.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 334.
17. Id.
18. Malindez, 962 F.2d at 334.
19. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1373-74 (1991); see infra text accompanying note 5354.
20. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (6-3 decision). Edmonson expanded the scope of Batson to civil
litigation. Id. at 2088-89. Courts had previously declined to apply Batson in civil cases, finding
that the actions of the trial judge and private attorneys did not constitute sufficient governmental
action to trigger the application of the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Dunham v. Frank's
Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 919 P.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2797 (1991).
However, the Edmnonson Court reasoned that state action in civil jury selection existed because
"without the overt, significant participation of the government, the peremptory challenge system,
as well as the jury trial system of which it is a part, simply could not exist." Ednonson, 111 S.
Ct. at 2084; see also Chavous v. Brown, 305 S.C. 387, 409 S.E.2d 356 (1991) (per curiam)
(applying Edmonson to civil cases in South Carolina).
21. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2089.
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Edmonson Court would not have remanded the issue for further determination.22
Malindez also argued the following:
[I]t follows logically that a primafacie case of racial discrimination is no
longer required from the fact that the right recognized in Powers is that of
the venireman to serve on a jury, not-as in Batson-the right of the
defendant to be tried by a jury from which members of his race have not
been excluded. 23
The court rejected this reasoning, noting that the primary purpose of the prima
facie case requirement is to assess the merits of the Batson objection.24 The
court further stated that the prima facie case requirement helps determine the
merit of claims raised by defendants asserting their own rights or the rights of
the stricken juror.25
Finally, Malindez argued that he was not required to present a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination because the mere striking of a minority from
the venire presumes racial motives.2 6 The court disagreed with Malindez,
noting that28 in United States v. Grandison27 it expressly rejected the same
argument.
The holding in Malindez mandates the continued application of the prima
facie case requirement for parties that raise a Batson objection and assert jury
selection discrimination. However, Malindez neither defines a "prima facie
case" 29 nor explains why Malindez failed to establish the requirement when
the prosecutor struck four black veniremen during the jury selection for his
30
trial.
Originally, for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, Batson
provided the following guidelines: First, the defendant must show membership
in a cognizable racial group 3 and show that the State exercised peremptory
22. Malindez, 962 F.2d at 334.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 885 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 934 (1990). "A prima facie case
of discrimination does not arise 'every time a prosecutor strikes a black prospectivejuror.'" Id.
at 149 (quoting United States v. Lane, 866 F.2d 103, 105 (4th Cir. 1989)).
28. Malindez, 962 F.2d at 334.
29. The Malindez court discussed the confusion surrounding the definition of a prima facie
case and stated, "we make no attempt here ... to define the elements of a primafacie case."
Id. at 333-34 n.3.
30. See id. at 333 n.2. Although the court noted that the prosecutor used four of the eight
peremptory challenges against the same racial group, the court did not offer to explain why such
action was insufficient to establish defendant's prima facie case. d.
31. Castaneda v. Partidadefines a cognizable racial group as "one that is a recognizable,
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challenges to remove members of that race from the jury. Second, the
defendant is allowed to rely on the fact that peremptory challenges constitute
a method of jury selection which permits discrimination. Third, the defendant
must demonstrate that these facts and other relevant circumstances raise an
inference that the prosecution used peremptory challenges to exclude
veniremen from the jury because of their race. 32 Batson suggested two
possible examples of prima facie cases: First, "a 'pattern' of strikes against
black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference
of discrimination." 33 Second, "the prosecutor's questions and statements
during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges may support or
refute an inference of discriminatory purpose. 34 While these suggestions are
not exclusive, they provide the challenging party with some general guidelines
for forming a prima facie case. However, much uncertainty still surrounds the
prima facie case concept. 35 In fact, much of the confusion over the prima
facie case may be attributed to the substantial flexibility and deference Batson
36
accorded the lower courts in dealing with this issue.
Furthermore, recent cases expanding the scope of Batson have substantially altered the initial concept of a prima facie case. Powers v. Ohio was the
first case to expand Batson by allowing defendants that neither belong to a
cognizable racial group37 nor share the same race as the stricken juror to
object to race-based exclusions of venireman. 3s Shortly thereafter, Edmonson
v. Leesville Concrete Co. extended Batson to civil cases. 39 Thus, the
language in the original prima facie case definition, referring to the "State"
distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied." 430
U.S. 482, 494 (1977).
32. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
33. Id. at 97.
34. Id.
35. As the Fourth Circuit noted in United States v. Grandison, "[n]o per se rule exists to
establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Nor does a prosecutorial checklist exist
to avoid the inference of discriminatory practices." 885 F.2d 143, 147 (4th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 934 (1990) (citations omitted).
36. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 ("We have confidence that trial judges, experienced in
supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use
of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors."); see
also id. at 99-100 n.24 ("In light of the variety of jury selection practices followed in our state
and federal trial courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts how best to implement our
holding today.").
37. See supra note 26 (defining cognizable racial group).
38. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991). The holding in Powers empowered a white defendant with
standing to successfully raise a Batson objection to the peremptory challenges of seven black
venireman. Id. at 1373. Note that while the objecting party is no longer required to belong to
a cognizable group, the stricken juror(s) must still meet this requirement. See id. (noting that the
objecting party is actually raising the juror's third party equal protection claim).
39. 111 S.Ct. 2077 (1991) (5-4 decision); see supra note 16.
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and "prosecution,"4 no longer limits Batson to criminal litigation. Finally,
n 4' negated the defendant's unilateral right
Georgia v. McCollum
to raise a
Batson objection by holding that prosecutors have standing to challenge a
criminal defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.42 Perhaps
the recent expansions of Batson will create further opportunities for courts to
refine and clarify the prima facie case requirement.
In South Carolina, courts so willingly find a prima facie case43 by the
challenging party that little discussion or controversy concerning the issue
exists." Two probable explanations exist. First, shortly after the Batson
decision the South Carolina Supreme Court recommended an automatic Batson
hearing if the objecting party met certain criteria.45 The court made this
recommendation in an attempt to "ensure consistency" and to avoid any
confusion triggered by a case by case treatment of the prima facie case issue
"under the vague guidelines set forth by the United States Supreme Court. "46
The court specifically provided that upon the defendant's request, a
hearing may be held whenever (1) "the defendant is a member of a cognizable
racial group," and (2) "the prosecutor exercises peremptory challenges to
remove members of defendant's race from the venire."'
These hearing
criteria are really just the first standards the Batson Court used to describe a
prima facie case.48 Whether intentional or not, the South Carolina Supreme
Court excluded Batson's third standard which required the defendant to
establish an inference of purposeful discrimination. Without the evidentiary
demands of this third guideline, one might argue a defendant is presumed to
have established a prima facie case in South Carolina by simply meeting the
hearing criteria: no showing of actual discrimination need be made. The
possibility of a presumed prima facie case has not been addressed by South

40. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97.
41. 112 S.Ct. 2348 (1992).

42. Id. at 2359.
43. The South Carolina Supreme Court has cited the exact prima facie case definition given
in Batson. See State v. Tomlin, 299 S.C. 294, 297, 384 S.E.2d 707, 709 (1989); State v.
Oglesby, 298 S.C. 279, 280, 379 S.E.2d 891, 891 (1989).
44. Only two of thirty South Carolina cases addressing Batson objections on appeal found that
a prima facie case had not been established. See State v. Elmore, 300 S.C. 130, 132, 386 S.E.2d
769, 770 (1989) (finding that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case when although the
state struck two black veniremen, the first black presented was accepted, a black alternate was
accepted, and the jury ultimately contained eleven whites and one black), cert. denied, 496 U.S.
931 (1990); State v. Smith, 293 S.C. 22, 23, 358 S.E.2d 389, 390 (1987) (per curiam) (finding
no prima facie case when the State struck two black venireman, but ultimately seated four blacks
jurors).

45. State v. Jones, 293 S.C. 54, 57, 358 S.E.2d 701, 703 (1987).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 57-58, 358 S.E.2d at 703.
48. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986).
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Carolina courts, but its implicit application may be one reason why virtually
all defendants, in cases considered on appeal, have established a prima facie
case.

49

A second possible explanation for why most defendants in South Carolina
are able to establish a prima facie case is that trial judges enjoy great
deference in assessing Batson objections.50 Given such deference, it appears
that many trial judges choose to err on the side of caution and find that the
defendant has established a prima facie case. From a numerical standpoint,
most prima facie cases considered on appeal in South Carolina involved
peremptory challenges of three or more minority venireman. 51 However, it
is not uncommon to find cases recognizing a prima facie case when the State
struck only one52 or two 53 black veniremen. Thus, while most prima facie
cases are established by elucidating a pattern of three or more strikes of
venireman belonging to a cognizable racial group, it is possible that the strike
of merely one or two minority veniremen will meet the initial Batson
requirement in South Carolina. However, the ease with which defendants
have established prima facie cases in South Carolina may be diminishing. In
particular, the Malindez and Powers holdings suggest that the challenging party
faces a higher evidentiary burden in establishing a prima facie case when the
defendant is of a different race than the stricken juror. For example, the
49. For example, consider State v. Wright, 304 S.C. 529, 405 S.E.2d 825 (1991), in which
the trial court did not find a prima facie case, but "'out of an abundance of caution,' required the
State to explain its strikes of two black jurors." Id. at 531, 405 S.E.2d at 826 (quoting the trial
judge). On appeal, the supreme court found that defendant "cured" his failure to establish a
prima facie case by satisfying the necessary Jones hearing criteria. Id. at 532, 405 S.E.2d at 827.
Thus, the court appeared to imply that satisfaction of its recommended hearing criteria presumes
the existence of a prima facie case.
50. State v. Grate, _ S.C. _, __, 423 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1992) ("A trial judge's findings
as to purposeful discrimination rest largely upon his evaluation of the solicitor's credibility, and
reviewing courts will accord them considerable deference.").
51. State v. Wilder, 306 S.C. 535, 413 S.E.2d 323 (1991) (finding a prima facie case when
the State struck four black veniremen); State v. Davis, 306 S.C. 246, 411 S.E.2d 220 (1991)
(finding a prima facie case when the State struck five black veniremen); State v. Richburg, 304
S.C. 162, 403 S.E.2d 315 (1991) (finding a prima facie case when the State struck five black
veniremen); State v. Lewis, 293 S.C. 107, 359 S.E.2d 66 (1987) (finding a prima facie case
when the State struck three black veniremen and one black alternate to seat an ultimately all-white
jury).
52. State v. Patterson, 307 S.C. 180, 414 S.E.2d 155 (1992) (finding a prima facie case when
the State struck the only qualified potential black juror); State v. Grandy, 306 S.C. 224, 411
S.E.2d 207 (1991) (finding a prima facie case when the State struck one black to obtain an all
white jury); State v. Woodruff, 300 S.C. 265, 387 S.E.2d 453 (1989) (finding a prima facie case
when the State struck one black juror, but no Batson violation found).
423 S.E.2d at 120 (finding a prima facie case when the State
53. Grate, _ S.C. at -'
struck two blackjurors). But see State v. Adams, 307 S.C. 368, 415 S.E.2d 402 (1992) (finding
no Batson violation where two blackjurors struck); State v. Green, 306 S.C. 94, 409 S.E.2d 785
(1991) (finding no Batson violation where two black jurors struck).
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Malindez court found that two Hispanic defendants did not establish a prima
facie case when four out of the Government's eight strikes were used against
black veniremen.5 4 The court added that additional evidence was required
in order to formulate a prima facie case.5 5 Malindez cited Powers v. Ohio
as suggesting that it may be easier to establish a prima facie case when both
the objecting party and the stricken juror belong to the same cognizable
group.5 6 Thus, the Fourth Circuit appears to require further proof (other
than the fact that several minority jurors were struck) to establish a prima facie
case when the objecting party and the excluded juror do not share the same
race. Unfortunately, the court failed to specifically discuss what types of
evidence might satisfy the increased burden of proof.
United States v. Malindez upheld the requirement that a challenging party
establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. However, it also
suggests that parties objecting to the exclusion of jurors who do not share the
same race as the defendant may face a higher evidentiary burden. In South
Carolina, where the vast majority of objecting parties make a prima facie
showing, it will be interesting to observe whether the increased evidentiary
demands will have any effect upon Batson issues.
Kenneth W. Gibson

54. United States v. Malindez, 962 F.2d 332, 333 n.2 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 215

(1992).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 334 (citing Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1373-74 (1991)).
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